From the Introduction:

Is it obvious, is it trivial, is it necessarily the case that there can’t be subjectless experiences? Is consciousness a paradigmatically subjective phenomenon? That is to say, is all phenomenal content structured in some experientially determinate way or does the phenomenality of consciousness admit of subjective indeterminacy? Should consciousness rather be understood as involving both phenomenal and subjective character? If so, what does its subjectivity consist in? And how does subjectivity show up (if it does) in our experience? More importantly, can subjectivity vanish altogether in certain conscious states? When individuals report ‘selfless’ states and body boundaries dissolution, what exactly makes their reporting possible? Are these states of ‘self-loss’ or simply instances of self-attenuated proprioceptive and interoceptive bodily signals that are still physiologically and experientially processed in the background? What happens to our embodied subjectivity when the self–world interdependence that grounds and regulates it is disrupted? Do Buddhists deny not only that there are no such things as metaphysical selves, but also that conscious experience lacks any perspectival givenness, first-personal presence, or for-me-ness? Are contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject, one that overemphasizes consciousness’s role in grasping intentional objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given? Is it really possible to speak meaningfully of a you (and of a we) if one denies the existence of even a minimal self, and if one declares the world of experience a neuronal fantasy? Last, but not least, can you imagine being no one?

Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality

Best known for his groundbreaking and influential work in Buddhist philosophy, Mark Siderits is the pioneer of “fusion” or “confluence philosophy", a boldly systematic approach to doing philosophy premised on the idea that rational reconstruction of positions in one tradition in light of another can sometimes help address perennial problems and often lead to new and valuable insights.

Exemplifying the many virtues of the confluence approach, this collection of essays covers all core areas of Buddhist philosophy, as well as topics and disputes in contemporary Western philosophy relevant to its study. They consider in particular the ways in which questions concerning personal identity figure in debates about agency, cognition, causality, ontological foundations, foundational truths, and moral cultivation. Most of these essays engage Siderits’ work directly, building on his pathbreaking ideas and interpretations. Many deal with issues that have become a common staple in philosophical engagements with traditions outside the West. Their variety and breadth bear testimony to the legacy of Siderits’ impact in shaping the contemporary conversation in Buddhist philosophy and its reverberations in mainstream philosophy, giving readers a clear sense of the remarkable scope of his work.